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TRAJECTORIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY:
A MULTI-LEVEL STUDY OF COMPETITION IN FORMULA ONE RACING
This paper explores the trajectories of three key technologies in Formula One racing at the
component, firm and system levels of analysis. The purpose is to understand the evolutionary
forces that contribute to the emergence and survival of dominant designs. Based on archival data
and contemporaneous accounts of the period from 1967-82, we develop a series of propositions
specifying the evolutionary forces acting on technological trajectories within each level of
analysis. The resulting framework leads to a set of predictions about relationships between
technological transparency, coevolution, and the emergence of dominant designs. Specifically,
we argue that when the costs and difficulty associated with transferring component knowledge
between firms is low (technological transparency is high), technologies tend to coevolve across
firms, leading to the development of complementary technologies and increasing the likelihood
of industry dominance. Where transparency is low, however, technologies tend to coevolve
across functions within firms, leading to the development of competing technologies across firms
and increasing the likelihood of a technology’s dominance within the firm. The data and
argument suggests that the forces acting on these two types of technological trajectories are self-
reinforcing, so that as momentum builds behind a trajectory, it becomes more likely that its
evolutionary path will end in either firm- or system-level dominance.
(Technology, Trajectories, Evolution, Competition)
1TRAJECTORIES IN THE EVOLUTION OF TECHNOLOGY:
A MULTI-LEVEL STUDY OF COMPETITION IN FORMULA ONE RACING
The centrality of technological innovation to economic development has meant that it provides
an enduring basis for research and debate. Work in this area has developed from the economic
principles of the production function (Abramovitz, 1956; Solow, 1957) to consideration of
managerial processes (Burns and Stalker, 1961), and more recently, to connect innovative
processes within the firm to the competitive dynamics within industries. Research has focused
on the concept of competitive strategy (Porter, 1983; Abernathy and Clark, 1985), dynamic
capability (Teece et al., 1997), institutions (Nelson and Winter, 1977) and coevolution
(Levinthal, 1992; Van de Ven and Garud, 1994; Lewin and Volberda, 1999). Studies have
considered the relationship between incumbents and new entrants (Christensen and Rosenbloom,
1995), the relationship between innovators and followers (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988),
the distinction between radical and incremental innovation (Banbury and Mitchell, 1995; Dewar
and Dutton, 1986) and the implications of competing organizations sharing technologies
(Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993; Garud and Kumaraswamy, 1993; Wade, 1995; Cohen et al.
2000).
All of these are important aspects of competitive dynamics and technological innovation.
However, they raise questions about: (1) how evolution differs at relevant levels of analysis
(technologies, firms, industries) and (2) how coevolutionary forces within or between these
levels affect the survival and dominance of technologies. These questions lie at the heart of the
relationship between technological innovation, competitive strategy and firm performance. They
are challenging, however, because answering them implies complex theory and a rich set of
2empirical observations. As one approach to this task, we employ an inductive, theory-building
method that draws on archival data and contemporaneous accounts. Using Rosenkopf and
Nerkar’s (1999) definition of analytical levels and Dosi’s (1982) notion of technological
trajectory as theoretical lenses, we evaluate technology developments over fifteen years of
Formula One racing.
Enfolding theory with data leads to a set of propositions on the evolutionary forces acting on
technological trajectories within each level of analysis. The resulting framework informs the
relationships between technological transparency, coevolution, and the emergence of dominant
designs. Specifically, we argue that when the costs and difficulty associated with transferring
component knowledge between firms is low (technological transparency is high), technologies
tend to coevolve across firms, leading to complementary technologies and increasing the
likelihood of industry dominance. When transparency is low, however, technologies tend to
coevolve across functions within firms, leading to competing technologies across firms and
increasing the likelihood of a technology’s dominance within the firm. Moreover, the data and
argument suggests that the forces acting on these two technological trajectories are self-
reinforcing, so that as momentum builds behind a trajectory, it becomes more likely that its
evolutionary path will end in either firm- or system-level dominance. In the discussion, we trace
the implications of the model for theories of competition in technologically intensive
environments.
Theoretical Background
In prior research, the role of technology in competition has been studied from at least three levels
of analysis, focusing on technology itself (Dewar and Dutton, 1986), on firms (Teece et al.,
31997) or on the industry (Abrahamson and Rosenkopf, 1993). Evolutionary theory is concerned
with explanation of processes where there are multiple units (individuals, firms, species, etc.)
interacting with an environment (Levinthal, 1992). Consistent with this perspective, Rosenkopf
and Nekar (1999) propose three levels of analysis within which technological evolution can be
observed (Figure 1). First, at the system level, a community of organizations can be defined.
Here, interactions between firms lead to the development of industry-wide standards and the co-
ordination of products. At this level, the evolution of technology may be influenced by
institutional forces (1994) and competitive rivalry (Porter, 1980; 1998). Second, the community
of actors within an organization defines the firm level of analysis. At this level, interactions
between individuals and sub-units, lead to the integration of technologies to produce products or
services (Grant, 1996b). Technological evolution at this level is likely influenced by the
boundedly rational decisions of managers (Levinthal and March, 1981) and by the structure and
culture of the hierarchy (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). At the third level of analysis, component-
specific communities external to the firm can be identified. Within this level, interactions among
individuals and groups focus on the development of ideas and lead to the creation of the core
knowledge (scientific basis) that forms the foundation of the product (Henderson and Clark,
1990; Tushman and Murmann, 1998).
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE
Rosenkopf and Nerkar (1999) stress the importance of coevolutionary effects both within and
across levels of the hierarchy. This concerns the inter-relationships between change at the
component, firm and system levels of analysis. Thus, for example, incremental evolution of
technology within the firm may be associated with punctuated evolution at the system level
(Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 1999). Coevolution may also be observed within a given level, as when
4complementary technologies coevolve within firms or systems, for example. This multiple-level,
coevolutionary view highlights historically dependent relationships among the experiences that
comprise the development of technology in a competitive context.
The meta-level concept of “technological trajectory” (Dosi, 1982) offers a way to conceptualize
the flow of such developments. Trajectories describe the path of a moving object across space
and time. Technological trajectories, therefore, may be defined as the series of path dependent
experiences that track with the evolution of a technology (Dierickx and Cool, 1989). We propose
technological trajectories as the thread connecting one experience to another within and across
levels of analysis. Building on Dosi (1982), one can discern three key attributes of such
trajectories—their power, momentum and degree of uncertainty.
Power and momentum refer respectively to the degree of influence and impetus behind a
trajectory. Among other things, technologies may gain or loose influence and momentum from
other technologies, and the relationships between technological trajectories may therefore be
described as complementary or competitive (1999). Complementary trajectories increase the
power and momentum of another trajectory while competing trajectories reduce them. A high
degree of complementarity between two technologies may even lead to their convergence--where
progress in one domain fuses directly with progress in another (Levinthal, 1998). The result may
be acceleration of the constituent technologies, as illustrated by the momentum given to optics
and electronics as the result of their convergence in fibre-optics (Kodama, 1992). In contrast,
competing technologies tend to sap one another of power and momentum, because developments
in one tend to come at the expense of developments in others. Over time, one trajectory is likely
5to become dominant, thereby establishing a powerful position, and reducing the power and
momentum of alternatives (Abernathy and Clark, 1985). Consistent with this, Dosi (1982)
defines the strength of a trajectory by the number of other technologies that it excludes
At the system level, such dominant designs have the effect of stabilizing the technological
frontier, as firms accept a particular level of technical and economic performance in order to
conform to the industry standard (Rosenkopf and Tushman, 1998). Similarly, dominance of a
technology within a firm creates organizational inertia as members or sub-units vested in the
technology use their centrality to control information and decision-making (Miller and Friesen,
1980). This effect within firms has also been described as the development of a
“paradigm”(Johnson, 1988), a term originally coined to describe the stability of scientific
progress at the component level, i.e. within scientific communities (Kuhn, 1962). Thus, dominant
technological trajectories produce inertial forces at all three levels of analysis, thereby limiting
change to incremental developments that are consistent with the dominant design (Christensen
and Bower, 1996).
In addition to power and momentum, uncertainty is the third key attribute of technological
trajectories. Early in the life cycle of competing technologies, before much momentum has
accumulated behind any one trajectory, there is often no basis for determining which will
become dominant (Anderson and Tushman, 1990). Over time, however, the uncertainties
surrounding the course of a trajectory are resolved and future developments become increasingly
predictable, predictability being perhaps the most desirable feature of dominant designs.
6In sum, the multi-level framework offered by Rosenkopf and Nerkar (Rosenkopf and Nerkar,
1999) and the concept of technological trajectory (Dosi, 1982) provide a potentially useful way
to describe the evolution of technology in a competitive context. This set of lenses suggests re-
framing questions of technological coevolution as questions about the power, momentum and
predictability of technological trajectories. More specifically, it suggests the following
questions: What are the sources of power and momentum for technological trajectories? How do
these differ within levels of analysis? What are the mechanisms of uncertainty resolution of
technological trajectories? How do they differ according to level of analysis?
Methodology
Koza and Lewin (1998) outline how longitudinal case studies provide unique opportunities for
empirical and theoretical interpretation. Our approach uses a detailed, historical case study to
derive new insights about the above questions. The historical case-based perspective involves
matching patterns in the data with theoretical explanations (Yin, 1981). Studies that focus on
multiple technologies, at multiple levels of analysis, over a significant period of time have the
advantage of permitting comparisons between, as well as within, technological trajectories in the
search for patterns. Fundamentally, however, even a single historical case may be a fruitful
source of explanation when it is accompanied by techniques such as theoretical sampling and
enfolding appropriate literature (Eisenhardt, 1989). Some of the best examples of theory
development draw on data from only one or a very few cases (Allison, 1971; Burgelman, 1983).
7The first and most crucial step in such a design is the selection of the case(s). The principle
criterion is the theoretical usefulness of the data for observing relevant phenomena. This
“theoretical sampling” approach suggests the need for historical observations from firms
competing in a technology-intensive environment. In this instance, we have used longitudinal
data of Formula One (F1) racing from 1967-1982 that combines industry, firm and component
levels of analysis. In prior work, data from F1 has provided a context for studies that consider the
localization of expertise (Pinch and Henry, 1999; Aston and Williams, 1996) and the flow of
knowledge between F1 racing and innovation in the motor industry (Foxall et al., 1992).
Today F1 represents the pinnacle of automotive technology. The circuits used in the
championship require cars that are both powerful and maneuverable; the industry has been
punctuated by several technical revolutions in engine and car design. The pace and
competitiveness of the industry is represented by the fact that no team or driver has won the
championship consecutively more than four times over fifty years of competition.
In addition to technological intensity the research questions focus on relationships between
technical developments and competitive outcomes. There are many factors that may explain
competitive success, including industry and corporate effects (McGahan and Porter, 1997;
Rumelt, 1991), frequently, this makes it difficult to separate out the influence of technology on
competition from these other influences. F1 provides an excellent objective measure of
competitive performance - winning races. Whilst there are other success criteria that may be
affected by technology (such as sales growth, safety record, TV coverage), race performance
(represented by the accumulation of championship points in a given year) is unambiguously
accepted within the industry as a key competitive outcome. Moreover, data relevant to
8technological change is regularly reported in light of its effect on winning. Indeed, the history of
the industry is permeated with observations about the relationship between technology and
competition. Many of these reports include the observers’ “theories-in-use” (Weick, 1995). This
mixture of fact and opinion provides a good context to study the phenomena and develop new
theory.
Data for the study draws on a large archival database. The data is uniquely rich because F1 is the
subject of constant media attention and generates an enormous amount of written material
detailing the actual words and actions of industry players--both individuals as well as firms--all
of which has been collected in an industry archive located at the in the southern region of the
United Kingdom.1 Published sources of data include periodicals (Autosport, Motor Sport,
Racecar Engineering), which provide full race-by-race accounts and detailed descriptions of the
“behind the scenes” activity of each team. This data is supplemented other accounts, including
autobiographies of the key players to create a detailed chronological database. In order to verify
the data, the first author conducted a series of in-depth interviews with the senior managers of
the F1 teams included in the study to provide contemporaneous accounts of historical events. A
semi-structured scheme was used which asked the individuals to describe critical incidents
(Campbell et al., 1970) and account for the performance of the team during the case period.
Assertions made by the interviewee were probed using the ‘laddering technique’, where
statements are explored in terms of their saliency to the individual by using the ‘why is that
important?’ question (Eden and Ackermann, 1998). This provides observations from individual
actors within all three levels of analysis. Some of the data is commentary, but much is objective,
1 BP Library of Motoring at the National Motor Museum. (Beaulieu), United Kingdom.
9and in some cases, quantitative in nature. This multi-layered data is necessary and appropriate for
inductive research (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 1981).
Study Context
The first Grand Prix was run by the Auto Club de France in 1906, but it wasn’t until 1950 that
the first world championship series was held linking the national races held in the UK, Monaco,
USA, Switzerland, Belgium, France and Italy. Whilst in many forms of motorsport the race
teams buy in the chassis [a term used to describe all aspects of the car except the engine and
gearbox], gearbox and engine, the F1 teams design, construct and race their own cars, gearboxes
and in some cases their own engines. The term constructor is used to represent this combination
of specialized capability. Whereas in the early 1950s automotive manufacturers such as
Maserati, Mercedes-Benz and Alfa-Romeo populated F1, by the 1970s it had become the domain
of specialist constructors, some of whom also produced high-performance road cars.
This study focuses on a period that begins with the development of the Ford DFV (Double-Four
Valve) engine in 1967 and includes the “ground-effect” revolution of the late 1970s that came to
an end in 1982. This period has been selected because it includes several technologies, which
appear to vary in terms of key factors identified in the analytical framework, i.e. power,
momentum and uncertainty.
Case Analysis
The first step in data analysis was to identify technological trajectories. To accomplish this, we
divided the data along three historical paths that reflect distinctive technological trajectories: (1)
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the events leading up to and including the dominance of the Ford DFV engine from 1967 - 1973,
(2) the experience of Ferrari’s unique “Flat-12” engine from 1974-1977, and (3) the activity
surrounding the revolution in aerodynamics and the emergence of Williams’ dominant “ground-
effect” design (1978-1982).
The Ford DFV technology involved the use of a purpose-built, ‘V8’ configuration that enabled
F1 constructors to acquire a highly competitive engine at a relatively low price. The significance
of the engine was that it formed a structural element of the car and therefore reduced overall
weight. The Ferrari “Flat-12” engine technology involved horizontal positioning of the pistons
to create a wide, flat engine with a low center of gravity. It represented a radical departure from
designs of the period. Ground-effect technology involved the use of the car’s underside to create
negative lift. The change causes the car to hug the surface of the track and significantly improves
cornering speed. Figure 2 illustrates the relative performance levels of these three technologies
during the period 1965-1982.
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.]
Subsequent inferences in the study are highly sensitive to the definition of technological
trajectories. Our choice of the Ford DFV engine, Ferrari Flat-12 and ground-effect trajectories is
thus a critical first step in the analysis. In making it, we considered opinions expressed in the
archival data and in the interviews with team executives. There was very little disagreement that
these three represent key developments during the period, although not everyone agreed about
their relative importance. For purposes of expositional clarity, the trajectories are bracketed by
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distinct sub-periods. Defining them in this way is not meant to suggest their independence,
however, and the analysis of the data was seamless in the sense that we did not impose a priori
constraints on the time frame for each trajectory. Moreover, given our evolutionary framework,
we were especially alert to reports in the data suggesting connections between trajectories. Thus,
we recount the case data in three sub-periods and highlight any apparent relationships between
developments in one trajectory and those in another.
The Ford DFV Period (1967-1973)
The Ford DFV ‘V8’engine was first used competitively in a Lotus 49 at the Dutch Grand Prix in
1967 and caused a sensation by winning its first race. The concept was not just about a better
performing engine. Rather, it was about using the engine as part of the car’s structure, thus
substituting for certain parts of the chassis and creating a lighter and well-powered racecar. The
concept of the DFV is illustrated in Figure 3.
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE.]
The Ford DFV was created by a joint venture between the Ford Motor Company, who funded the
project, Cosworth Engineering, who designed and built the engine and Lotus Cars. Lotus
designed and built the Lotus 49 around the engine during the 1967 season. The engine became
available to other teams in 1968, and quickly became a technological imperative.
“...for ten years that engine pretty well ruled the roost. Anyone with enough money, and in the
first year[1968] it was only £7,500, went to Cosworth and came away with an engine that was
capable of winning the next race. That went on for many years which is the reason why there
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are so many British formula one teams, only that reason, only because that engine was
available” (Interview with F1 Team Principal)
In 1968 Lotus were joined by McLaren and Matra in using the Ford DFV. The Brabham team
followed in 1969. During the early seventies F1 was dominated by the Ford engined ‘kit-car’.
The term kit-car refers to the fact that the constructor designed and manufactured the chassis and
suspension while the engine and gearbox components were supplied from outside. In this case
‘the kit’ included the Ford DFV engine, manufactured by Cosworth Engineering, and the
gearbox built by Hewland Engineering. In 1969 and 1973 a car with a Ford DFV engine won
every Grand Prix, the only occasion in the history of F1 that a single engine totally dominated a
season. Figure 2 illustrates its performance.
The Ferrari Renaissance 1974-1977
The availability of the Ford DFV meant that the constructors who were vertically integrated and
built their own engines and gearboxes, such as Ferrari and BRM, were at a disadvantage. Their
‘in-house’ capability appeared to be no longer valid. A merger with Fiat in 1969 provided a
huge injection of cash and resources for Ferrari, and this allowed the design and construction of a
new larger 12 cylinder engine with the cylinders horizontally opposed, creating a powerful, wide
engine with a low center of gravity, referred to as a ‘Flat-12’. The configuration of the Flat-12 is
contrasted with the V8 in Figure 4.
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE.]
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Ferrari had historically seen the engine as the critical aspect of racecar performance:
‘Horsepower was everything to Mr. Ferrari and, following his lead, to most of his engineers.
Handling was secondary. Engines to the fore – chassis were regarded merely as brackets to
prevent the wheels falling off and to carry the driver and the fuel load.’ (Nye, 1998). The new
engine enabled some progress, with a promising performance in 1970, but this was not sustained
due to problems with reliability.
However, the huge investment in R&D had included the building of the first purpose-built F1
test track at Fiorano, northern Italy in 1971. In 1973, founder Enzo Ferrari, who had been
suffering from ill-health, appointed an understudy to take on the day to day management of the
team. Luca di Montezemolo, a 25 year old lawyer, was an unlikely lieutenant to Il
Commendatore. Many, now see him, however, to have been the catalyst for Ferrari’s most
successful period since the 1950s. Montezemolo made some major personnel and managerial
changes, including the recruitment of a young driver (Niki Lauda) who worked closely with
Mauro Forghieri—the chief designer behind the development of the ‘Flat-12’ engine. This
partnership culminated in the 312T car which used the ‘Flat-12’ in combination with Ferrari’s
own unique transverse [mounted across the car] gearbox. Ferrari concentrated on an exhaustive
development program at Fiorano to ensure that the concept would be reliable as well as fast. The
consequence was that, for the first time since 1967, the Ford DFV constructors were seriously
challenged.
“Similarly, nobody can claim to have really expected the renaissance of the Ferrari team. It was
only the middle of last season that the Italians were staying home from races and having open
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disagreements with their star driver. They seemed to be working on the wrong lines both
mechanically and managerially. Yet over the winter they have put everything right, revised both
machines and management, and were a threat right from the first race in January.” Pete Lyons,
Autosport, July 4, 1974, p35
The renaissance of Ferrari meant that the teams using the Ford DFV were being challenged by a
radically different and unique approach to racecar construction. This produced a number of
differing responses. In the case of the Brabham team it seemed that the logical response was to
move away from the Ford DFV.
“Halfway through that year [1975] it was pretty obvious that a twelve cylinder engine – because
Ferrari didn’t have any other magic at the time; they just powered away on all the quick circuits
–was going to end the reign of the [Ford] DFV. It was obvious that you had to have more than
eight cylinders. And so we started looking around for a twelve.” (Former Technical Director
Brabham)
Brabham reached an agreement with Alfa Romeo to supply a ‘Flat-12’ engine developed by
engine specialist Carlo Chiti. This decision had major implications for the team and the design
of the car.
“The BT45 [Brabham’s first car with the Alfa Romeo engine] was a completely new car. It was
a Flat-12 engine, it was a non-structural engine [the engine did not form part of the chassis as
with the Ford DFV], so it was a total rethink and I had six months to design and build a Flat-12
Alfa car for the beginning of the ‘76 season.” (Former Technical Director Brabham)
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In contrast, two other constructors - Tyrrell and Lotus - retained the Ford DFV, but developed a
more radical chassis in order to increase performance. Tyrrell developed a six-wheeled car with
four small wheels at the front designed to improve aerodynamic penetration and to the area of
tire gripping surface. The Tyrrell P34 was announced in 1975 and first raced in 1976.
“It was becoming apparent to me that the Ford engine had lost its edge, I mean that it was still
producing the same horsepower, but with the success of the Ferrari, the possible success of
engines like Matra or anybody else who came along with a Flat-12, V12 or 12 cylinder
whatever, you’re going to be outclassed apart from that you’ve got the same [Ford] engine as
many other teams, so you’ll be scratching for a little bit here and a bit there and I wanted to
make a big breakthrough.” . (Former Technical Director Tyrrell)
Lotus also focused on the aerodynamics of the chassis and in 1977 introduced the first ‘ground-
effect’ car, the Lotus 78, an approach that was enormously successful.
The Ground-Effect Revolution 1978-1982
The original development of aerodynamics in racecars had involved the use of ‘wings’ or
external aerofoils to create downforce which improves grip. In contrast, the ground-effect
concept uses the underbody of the car, rather than the upper body or wings, to create a low
pressure area, thereby holding the car to the ground and allowing it to travel at far greater speeds
when cornering. Two tunnels (or venturi) run along the sides of the car and widen out towards
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the rear, thereby reducing the pressure and creating a suction effect as the air runs under the car.
The principles of ground-effect are summarized in Figure 5.
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE.]
In 1974 Lotus team owner Colin Chapman asked his Technical Director to take a look at the
entire concept of a racecar to see where the performance gains could be made. The Technical
Director, along with a specialist aerodynamicist, explored the prospect of producing ground-
effect in an F1 car. These two individuals had experimented with these ideas almost ten years
earlier when they both worked for BRM. Whilst ground-effect had been developed as a
theoretical concept, practical application in F1 was still unresolved. This was achieved by a
breakthrough in using ‘skirts’ - strips down the sides of the car that effectively sealed the area
underneath. As with many great discoveries this came almost by accident.
“...until one day the [wind-tunnel] model was so decrepit we started getting variable results. It
would be modified so often, it was made of card and plastic and clay and tape and what have
you. We got inconsistent results and we couldn’t figure out why and then I noticed that the side
pods were sagging and we thought, well what’s sagging got to do with it? We thought maybe it’s
the gap at the edge [between the car and the ground], so we put some card down the edge in a
little tiny gap and wumph! We couldn’t believe it! We had to re-do [the test] four times before
we believed it.” Former Lotus Aerodynamicist.
It was the Lotus design that proved to be the most successful innovation, winning the
constructors championship in 1978 by a significant margin. Founder Colin Chapman had been
responsible for introducing a number of innovations borrowed from aircraft technology such as
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the monocoque chassis and had been a prime mover in the Ford DFV project. In contrast to
Ferrari’s focus on engine horsepower, Lotus had always concentrated on chassis development for
technical advancement. In addition Chapman’s involvement in the development of the Ford
DFV made it unlikely that he would follow Brabham and seek an alternative engine source:
“Colin wouldn’t consider departing from the Cosworth engine because of the links with Lotus
[Cosworth founders Keith Duckworth and Mike Costin had both worked for Lotus in the early
sixties]. He was also very patriotic and would always want a British engine in his cars.”
(Former Technical Director of Lotus)
The Lotus 78 established ground-effect technology and many constructors attempted to imitate
the design. Here imitation was more practical as the majority was using the same engine
configuration as Lotus [Ford DFV] and therefore had only to concentrate on re-design of the
chassis. What was particularly significant about ground-effect was that Ferrari’s commitment to
a Flat-12 engine meant that they were unable to create the narrow under-body profile needed to
locate the ground-effect venturi either side of the engine. The narrow Ford V8 was ideally suited
to this application, whereas the wide Flat-12 engine meant that there was no space for the
venturi. The same problem also applied to Brabham who had shifted to the Alfa Romeo Flat-12
in 1976.
“The basic car was, in the end, quite quick, the engine was good, the aerodynamics were good,
and we had a mini recovery, and then we had a slap back right in the middle of that – ground-
effect. So now we’re stuck with a meter wide Flat-12 engine right where the [ground-effect]
venturi tail wants to start lifting.” (former technical director, Brabham)
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This problem prompted Brabham’s Technical Director to develop the ground-effect in a car with
a Flat-12 engine.
We were sitting there racking our brains thinking how else can we have downforce with a Flat-
12 engine. The Fan Car bought us time to go back to Alfa and say we need a V12 engine in
three months for the beginning of the 78 season. And so we had another complete start again
during the 77 season.” (former technical director, Brabham)
The Fan-Car was an attempt to resolve the problem by creating ‘artificial’ ground-effect using a
mechanical fan attached to the rear of the car that sucked the air from underneath. The Brabham
BT46B ‘fan-car’ was a product of this innovative period and won the Swedish Grand Prix in
1978. Ultimately, it was banned because it was deemed to be outside the regulations and
because of the alleged danger to drivers from debris being sucked through the fan.
Whilst Brabham were attempting to find ways to achieve ground-effect with a Flat-12 engine,
Ferrari appeared to ignore the phenomena and concentrated on developing their engine and
chassis along the same lines as 1974. This however left them hopelessly uncompetitive against
the ground-effect cars. “Maranello’s [location of Ferrari factory] Flat-12, still a magnificent
racing engine, is incompatible with modern chassis. [Drivers] Villeneuve and Scheckter were
competing in yesterday’s cars.” Roebuck (1980). It wasn’t until the appointment of a new
Senior Engineer who had previously designed ground-effect cars that the extent of Ferrari’s
myopia became clear. “Everyone else had them [ground-effect aerodynamics] for years, but
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until I arrived [1981] it was quite firmly believed that they didn’t exist.” (Former Senior
Engineer, Ferrari)
Following the success of the Lotus 78, Colin Chapman sought to move the concept forward with
the more complex Lotus 79 and the Lotus 80. In the Lotus 80, the concept was to increase the
ground-effect to the extent that the car needed no external wings, but this proved to be less
controllable on the track. In an effort to resolve the problem, Chapman and his design team
developed a revolutionary twin chassis car, the Lotus 88. The 88 was, however, the subject of
protests by all the major teams, and in 1981, the governing body banned the design.
Williams Grand Prix Engineering (WGPE), formed in 1973, was a relatively new, low budget
operation. Designer, Patrick Head, imitated the ground-effect concept developed by Lotus, but
in a way that was consistent with stringent financial limitations. It proved to be a simple, but
highly effective interpretation of the concept. Whilst the Lotus 80 found the limit of applying
the ground-effect concept, the Williams FW07 was considered to be the optimal application of
the concept to a Formula 1 car.
“..he [Chapman] thought that they [Williams] had made a better quality job of his original
concept. I think he felt that the construction of the cars was probably better than ours.”
(Former Chief Mechanic, Lotus)
Following on from the ground-effect revolution a number of constructors had begun to look at
alternative materials to use in the construction of the car. Ground-effect worked most effectively
when the car was totally rigid; if there were too much flexing of the chassis then this would
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destabilize the ground-effect. This problem became evident to the technical team at Lotus when
they saw a slow motion television shot of one of their cars at the Monaco Grand Prix: “..the car
was coming in to view down the hill in slow motion and as it came round the corner it seemed
alive, the whole car was like a snake, we realized that it just shouldn’t be doing that, that’s not a
stable platform to work the car from.” (Former Technical Director of Lotus)
A change of chassis construction from aluminum to carbon fiber solved the problem. Brabham
were the first team to use carbon fiber as part of their chassis, but it was McLaren in 1980 who
came up with the first full carbon composite monocoque. Using specialist composite fabricator
Hercules the McLaren team were the first team to involve a specialist to build their entire
monocoque. “the next day we got on a plane with the drawings, with the model in the overhead
locker, and off we went to Salt Lake City and that was it – just like that it developed to Hercules
building the first monocoque for us.” (Former Technical Director, McLaren).
We have attempted to distill some of the key aspects of the development of this industry during
the period 1967-1982. Table 1 summarizes these as they relate to each of three levels of analysis
outlined in Figure 1.
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
Competitive Dynamics of Technological Trajectories
Table 2 reviews the description of technological trajectories that our case analysis
suggests. Rows identify the level of analysis, and columns show the attributes or dimensions of
technological trajectories suggested by the analytical framework. The three levels of analysis are
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“nested” within one another, such that systems are comprised of multiple firms and firms are
comprised of multiple component technologies. Columns represent a logic where trajectories in
physical objects start as the result of an application of physical force. We have labelled such
force “power,” because in a technological trajectory, velocity appears to depend on the degree of
influence wielded by the technology, i.e. the extent to which it affects the behaviour of actors
within the communities at each level of analysis. (Interestingly, this relationship does not appear
to be a linear one, as will be discussed below.) Following the logic of the metaphor, momentum
accelerates the velocity of a trajectory, and this, too, appears to differ according to the nature of
influence within level of analysis. Finally, like physical trajectories, actors within each
community attempt to influence the direction of technological development. Hence, the third
column suggests the decision-making or uncertainty resolution mechanisms employed at each
level.
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE
Sources of Power, Momentum and Uncertainty Resolution
All knowledge begins within individuals (Grant, 1996b; Nonaka, 1994; Spender, 1996), we
therefore begin the description of trajectories at the component level, the world of ideas, where
the community’s key concern is the development of knowledge. Actors at this level of analysis
include, for example, the design team within Cosworth who developed the Ford DFV, Mauro
Forghieri and the design group within Ferrari who produced the Flat-12 engine and the Technical
Director and aerodynamicist at Lotus who developed the ground-effect concept. At these early
stages, trajectories are relatively uncontaminated by other forms of knowledge or interests. As
the aerodynamicist at Lotus suggested, the source of an idea’s power at this point is its ability to
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demonstrate “a better way of doing things.” As a concept “proves” itself along these lines, it
gains increasing attention and influence within the community. Proof of concept, however, relies
on methods and approaches that are grounded in a particular belief system. A trajectory’s ability
to get started, therefore, may be restrained by its lack of fit with the dominant paradigm (Kuhn,
1962). Thus, for example, it took nearly a decade for an idea from aerodynamics to be accepted
in racecar design. But in Ferrari, the development of the Flat-12 engine was launched directly
from the organization’s collective belief in engines. In each case, the strength of an idea lies in
its ability to solve a particular problem, thereby ruling out alternatives (Dosi, 1982) and focusing
activity around a given technical direction.
Proposition 1: Technological trajectories start at the component level as the
result of this community’s belief in the problem-solving potential of a new
idea.
At the firm level, a trajectory appears to gain influence by creating inter-dependencies with
component technologies already in place. Adoption of the Ford DFV engine, for example,
required radical changes in chassis design to take advantage of its structural features. In Ferrari,
“horsepower was everything” (Nye, 1998), and thus everything was built around the engine,
including the chassis design and gearbox. Indeed, the power of Ferrari’s commitment to engines,
undermined consideration of the ground-effect concept, while Lotus’ focus on the chassis
provided an ideal environment for the idea to take hold. These and the relative power of one
component over others, therefore, seem to be based on the number and strength of inter-
dependencies it creates with other technologies. The concept of inter-dependencies as a source of
power within the firm is consistent with knowledge-based theories of the firm wherein
hierarchies are seen principally as mechanisms for integrating and applying the knowledge of
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technical specialists (Conner and Prahalad, 1996; Grant, 1996a). In addition, the number and
strength of inter-dependencies has been shown to be a source of influence in studies of intra-
organizational power (Hinings et al., 1974).
Proposition 2: Technological trajectories take hold and gain power within
firms by virtue of the number and strength of inter-dependencies they create
with other component technologies.
At the system level, the power of a trajectory appears to be related to the level of consensus
among firms, and in particular, the degree to which firms agree about the value of a technology
to their (individual) success. For example, the Ford DFV engine emerged as the agreed upon
design for Lotus, McLaren, Matra and Brabham in less than two years. Similarly, the influence
of ground-effect was represented by rapid widespread adoption within the system. Both these
technologies became dominant designs at the system level. Ferrari’s Flat-12 design, in contrast,
gained very little power at the system level with only one other team (Brabham) moving in a
similar direction. The difference appears to be the extent that the technologies were perceived as
a viable means of improving performance. Importantly, however, these perceptions about what
creates success were bounded by higher order norms within the system, so that, for example,
trajectories that are outside regulatory norms (like the Brabham fan car) develop very little power
at the system level. This explanation resonates with an institutional theorists’ explanation of
technological evolution wherein adoption is driven by collective belief, social norms and formal
regulations (Scott, 1995).
Proposition 3: The power of a technological trajectory at the system level is
rooted in the degree of consensus among key actors within firms about the
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technology’s role in performance, which is influenced and constrained by
social norms and regulations.
Momentum develops as the result of additional or reinforcing applications of power. Thus, the
theoretical arguments for power contain within them an explanation for how momentum
develops at each level (Table 1). At the component level, momentum is gained by technical
achievement. This may be defined within the paradigm then operating or, in rare cases, by a
revolutionary approach (Kuhn, 1962). At the firm level, actors are concerned with more than
technical achievement, however, and a trajectory’s momentum at this level is accelerated by a
belief within the firm that it can achieve a broader range of goals. Thus, critical inter-
dependencies may be created by a technology when it is seen to contribute to survival (Aldrich,
1979), stakeholder satisfaction (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), economic profit and other
performance-related goals. At the system level, momentum-building processes are similarly
grounded in the perceptions of actors, here the consensus about a technology emerges as a
legitimation process, wherein links to performance are defined on the basis of observed
successes as constrained by formal and informal norms of the community (Scott, 1995).
Proposition 4: The momentum of technological trajectories is accelerated by
perceptions among actors at the component level that the solution
contributes to technical achievement, at the firm-level that it contributes to
goal achievement and at the system level that it contributes to social
legitimacy.
Thus, the momentum created behind the Ford DFV engine at the system level developed as the
belief spread that anyone with enough money could go to Cosworth and come away with an
engine that was capable of winning races. Ferrari’s investments in the Flat-12 engine accelerated
as it was seen to be the key to the team’s renaissance—not only in technical performance but in
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rebuilding the team’s status and prestige among key stakeholders (owners, sponsors, publics).
Finally, although the ground-effect concept was initially impeded at the component level because
it did not fit the paradigm, once the dramatic improvements it made in performance were
understood, it spurred a revolution in chassis design within the technical community.
The description of technological trajectories would not be complete without identifying the
means that actors use to resolve uncertainties about the trajectory’s path. Resolution of such
uncertainties becomes important as actors individually or collectively attempt to anticipate the
future course of events and shape them in ways that contribute to their perceived self-interest.
These efforts imply a desire to understand and influence the direction and/or velocity of the
technology’s development. Thus, uncertainty-reducing and decision-making processes within
each level can be described in accordance with the explanations of power and momentum.
Consistent with the institutional explanations of consensus at the system level, political
processes, including negotiation, bargaining and compromise are the chief means by which
actors settle differences and come to a consensus about the role of a particular technology (Scott,
1995). At the firm-level, technological uncertainties are reduced as boundedly rational actors
attempt to make judgments about the means to achieve organizational goals (Simon, 1957).
Finally, at the component level, where science and engineering concerns dominate, the principal
of uncertainty reduction is learning, most often in the form of experimentation.
Proposition 5A: Experimental learning processes are used to reduce
uncertainty and make decisions related to technological trajectories at the
component level.
Proposition 5B: Boundedly rational decision making processes are the
source of uncertainty reduction at the firm level.
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Proposition 5C: Political processes in the form of bargaining, negotiation
and compromise govern decision-making and uncertainty-reduction at the
system level.
Thus, for example, at the component level, the development of ground-effect technology
followed a path of numerous experiments by designers within Lotus, Brabham, Williams and
others. Learning occurred at the component level as one iteration won out over the rest, and
ultimately, Williams’ formula proved optimal. The evolution of ground-effect technology was
also shaped by decisions to adopt it at the firm level. In each case, these decisions are based not
only on actors’ attempts to improve performance, but also, on the resource and other constraints
imposed by unique firm goals. Thus, Ferrari and Brabham attempted to adapt the technology to
suit larger engines, while Williams adapted it to fit their financial constraints. Finally, the
political processes at the system level—that occurred within the regulatory body (Fédération
Internationale de l’Automobile -FIA) and among its members (the constructors)—led to
agreements about how ground-effect should be constrained, including the ban on the use of
“artificial” means, i.e. Brabham’s Fan-Car.
In sum, technological trajectories are social phenomena, created and sustained by belief within
the relevant communities of action. Sociological processes within each community affect their
growth, velocity and direction. Good explanations for their development therefore include the
sociology of science (Kuhn, 1962), bounded rationality (Simon, 1957) and institutional
mechanisms (Scott, 1995). This description offers a synthesis of the evolutionary forces affecting
technology trajectories at different levels of analysis. By itself, however, it does not add to what
we know about how a technology evolves into a position of dominance. Indeed, institutional and
competitive influences on this process have been described in prior research (Abrahamson and
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Rosenkopf, 1993). Nor does the framework address questions about the coevolution of
technology. In the next section, however, we suggest an explanation of dominance that, while
consistent with prior theory, moves beyond earlier models--tracing the roots of dominance to the
nature and coevolution of component technologies. To do so requires animating our discussion
by tracing a trajectory’s path within and between the levels of analysis.
Tracing the Paths of Technological Trajectories
Power explains the impetus and velocity of technological trajectories, but what governs their
direction? Figure 6 suggests that the relative transparency of component knowledge plays a key
role in determining the coevolutionary forces that direct a technology’s development. The nature
of these coevolutionary forces (primarily within or between firms), then, explains whether a
technology’s path is more likely to end in firm- or system-level dominance.
INSERT FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE
Consistent with prior theory (Kogut and Zander, 1992), we define transparency as the cost and
difficulty involved in transferring technology among individuals. Distinct from inimitability
(Barney, 1991), which describes a similar phenomenon between firms, we reserve the concept of
transparency to the component level. It is therefore associated with codifiability (Boisot, 1998;
Winter, 1987) and the extent to which component knowledge can be easily shared among
technical specialists (Wade, 1995).
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As the figure shows, when component technology is transparent, critical knowledge elements are
easily shared among technical professionals within firms. Under conditions of competitive
rivalry and demand for new products, knowledge diffusion leads to multiple applications of the
technology within firms. The technology changes as it is adapted to idiosyncratic firm goals and
as it is fused with other path dependent processes (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nelson and
Winter, 1977; Rosenkopf and Nerkar, 1999). These variations coevolve across rival firms as
some applications compete more successfully than others.
In addition, firm-level processes that serve to bundle the component technology in different ways
stimulate additional variety in the form of complementary technologies. Some of these arise from
other functions or divisions within the firm. As the technology is adopted widely at the system
level, still other complementary technologies develop through relationships with outside
organizations (e.g. suppliers). Thus, a high level of transparency tends to push technology
development in the direction of coevolution across firms (inter-firm coevolution). Transparency
stimulates variety between firms, as well as within them. This coevolutionary process may lead
to dominance of the technology at the industry level.
The Ford DFV engine offers the best example of transparent component technology in the
Formula One data. Ford and Cosworth provided detailed engineering drawings and technical
assistance to virtually any team that was willing and able to pay for them. However, there was
still a great deal of variation among firms in terms of how the technology was applied. The
coevolution of these alternative interpretations produced an increasingly refined approach
supported by the development of many complementary technologies—both of which further
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reinforced adoption within the industry. In the end, the technology was judged within most firms
to be “the only way to compete,” i.e. it was the dominant industry design.
When transparency is low, diffusion of ideas within the technical community proceeds more
slowly. Sometimes real interest is limited to only one or a few individuals or groups. Often these
people are concentrated in a particular firm, whose goals and history happen to align with the
technology, and sometimes, the firm’s goals and/or culture create the technology. Whether in one
or a few firms, then, the technology tends to take hold. Coevolutionary processes are primarily
based in the interactions between the new technology and existing component technologies
within individual firms. Once technologies become integrated across functions and embedded in
the organizational routine, coevolutionary forces within particular firms tend to decrease
transparency even further because the knowledge associated with the technology becomes more
tacit (Nelson and Winter, 1977; Nonaka, 1994).
This inimitability may be good for competitive advantage (Barney, 1991), but it limits inter-firm
coevolution and the development of complementary technologies. Trajectories that go down this
path, then, are not likely to reach dominance at the system level. Where the technology is
particularly critical to firm goals, however, it might be said that such technologies may lead to
firm-level dominance. This dominance is significant because it leads to sub-unit power and
functional orientation which, in turn, may influence firm goals and the assimilation/creation of
new technologies.
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Ferrari’s Flat-12 engine was clearly not transparent to designers in other firms. In some
respects this was a result of the fact that the technology originated within Ferrari. Indeed,
it is likely that the level of transparency in a component technology varies depending on
its origin. (Note the feedback loops in Figure 6). If it comes from an established technical
discipline, such as aerodynamics, it is more likely to be highly codified and thus
transparent. If it comes from a relatively small group of engineers within a single firm
where there is less need to be explicit, however, the technology is less likely to be
codified. The Flat-12 originated within the Ferrari culture, and lack of transparency
limited coevolution between firms. Complementary technologies were impeded, and
although it became dominant within the firm, the Flat-12 never became dominant at the
system level, despite the efforts of Brabham to adopt the technology.
Thus,
Proposition 6: The transparency of new component technologies affects the
direction of their development: higher levels increasing interactions between
firms and lower levels increasing coevolutionary processes across functions
or divisions within firms.
Proposition 7: Technological coevolution between firms increases the number
and variety of complementary technologies while technological coevolution
within firms limits the number and variety of complementary technologies.
Proposition 8: Highly transparent component technologies are more likely to
become dominant at the system level.
Conclusion
In summary we develop two central themes concerning the nature of technological
innovation and the evolution of dominant designs. The first is the differences in terms of
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power, momentum and uncertainty reduction in trajectories at differing levels of analysis.
Clarifying such differences helps us to disaggregate some of the complexity and inter-
dependencies within the innovative process. As a consequence, we are able to present a
series of fine-grained propositions concerning the nature of technological evolution. The
second is the concept of technological transparency and its role in either generating the
complementary technologies necessary for systems level acceptance (dominant design) or
building firm level dominance and competitive advantage amongst competing
organizations.
The concept of technological transparency also underlines the contrasts between the
development of intra-firm proprietary technologies and inter-firm technologies that
coevolve at the industry level. The tension between these underlines the importance of a
dynamic, multi-level model. Each level of analysis provides a distinctive source of
momentum. Firms’ seek to achieve their particular goals and develop technologies that
provide advantage through superior individual technologies and the synergies created by
inter-dependencies across technologies. Component level-communities seek to ensure
the dominance of a particular technological solution and the achievement of
technological outcomes. In contrast, the system seeks balance and legitimacy in how the
technology performs--along political, economic and social dimensions.
The strength and direction of a trajectory evolves across levels of analysis. Trajectories
take shape first at the component level (technological trajectory) and may develop later at
the systems level (socio-technological trajectory). At the firm level, they are influenced
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by an architecture of inter-dependent technologies (Henderson and Clark, 1990). The
tensions and contrasts between levels--the need to reconcile technological imperatives
with firm level goals and systems level acceptance—create momentum and drive the
trajectory’s development.
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Table 1: Summary of Key Aspects of Case Outline
Ford DFV Period
1967-1973
Ferrari Renaissance
1974-1977
Ground-effect Revolution
1978-1982
System-level
community
Ford DFV becomes
the basis of dominant
design;
with complementary
designs in gearbox
and chassis
Period of ferment
and variation
between Ford DFV
and Ferrari Flat-12
Ground-effect becomes
accepted standard, including
use of ‘skirts’
Firm-level
community
Alliance between
Lotus and Cosworth
create Ford DFV but
technology is easily
acquired by
competing firms
Firms either
innovate (6 wheel
Tyrrell; ground-
effect Lotus) or
imitate – Brabham
with Alfa Romeo
engine
Lotus develop innovation but
others follow and imitate
concepts
Component-level
community
Development of
engine and related
components
Distinction between
engine driven
innovation; and
chassis driven
innovation
Development of ground-
effect aerodynamics and
related materials (carbon
composite); concept of Flat-
12 engine undermined by
need for underbody venturi
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Table 2:
Sources of power, momentum and uncertainty resolution within technological trajectories
at the system-, firm- and component-levels of analysis
Sources of
Power
Sources of
Momentum
Uncertainty
Resolution Process
System-level community Consensus Legitimacy
(Dominant Design)
Politics
Firm-level community Technical Inter-
dependencies
Goal achievement Bounded rationality
Component-level
community
Development of the
technological
paradigm
Technical
achievement
Experimentation
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Figure 1: Levels of Analysis of Technological Evolution (Rosenkopf and Nerkar, A. 1999)
System-Level Community
Firms
Component-Specific
Communities
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Figure 2: Relative Performance of Racecar Technologies
Note: The vertical axis represents the relative race performance of a particular technology based on championship points accumulated during the year. Each car is awarded
10 points for a win, six points for second, four points for third and from three to one point from fourth to sixth respectively.
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Figure 3: Principles of the Ford DFV
Racecar configuration Pre 1967
Monocoque Chasis
Engine
Lotus 49 configuration 1967
Monocoque Chasis
Ford DFV engine
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Figure 4: Flat-12 and V8 engine configuration
Ferrari ‘Flat 12’ engine
(from rear of car)
Ford DFV ‘V8’ Engine
(from rear of car)
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Figure 5: Ground-effect Racecar
Location of ground effect venturi in car fitted with Ford DFV
(from rear of car)
Venturi from side of car
Venturi
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Figure 6: Technological Transparency and the Coevolution of Innovations
Component
dominance
within the
firm
Component
dominance
within the
system
Transparency
of component
technology
(Cost and
difficulty of
knowledge
transfer)
Coevolution of
technology
across
functions
and
development of
competing
(vertically
integrated)
designs
Coevolution of
technology
across firms
and
development of
complementary
(horizontally
integrated)
designs
Low
High
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